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    SubjectRe: [PATCH v10 8/9] KVM: Handle page fault for private memory
    On Fri, Dec 02, 2022, Chao Peng wrote:
    > @@ -5599,6 +5652,9 @@ int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 err
    > return -EIO;
    > }
    >
    > + if (r == RET_PF_USER)
    > + return 0;
    > +
    > if (r < 0)
    > return r;
    > if (r != RET_PF_EMULATE)
    > @@ -6452,7 +6508,8 @@ static bool kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte(struct kvm *kvm,
    > */
    > if (sp->role.direct &&
    > sp->role.level < kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, sp->gfn,
    > - PG_LEVEL_NUM)) {
    > + PG_LEVEL_NUM,
    > + false)) {

    Passing %false is incorrect. It might not cause problems because KVM currently
    doesn't allowing modifying private memslots (that likely needs to change to allow
    dirty logging), but it's wrong since nothing guarantees KVM is operating on SPTEs
    for shared memory.

    One option would be to take the patches from the TDX series that add a "private"
    flag to the shadow page role, but I'd rather not add the role until it's truly
    necessary.

    For now, I think we can do this without impacting performance of guests that don't
    support private memory.

    int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
    const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
    int max_level)
    {
    bool is_private = kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot) &&
    kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn);

    return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, gfn, max_level, is_private);
    }

    > diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
    > index 25099c94e770..153842bb33df 100644
    > --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
    > +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
    > @@ -2335,4 +2335,34 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
    > }
    > #endif /* __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */
    >
    > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
    > +static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
    > +{

    This code, i.e. the generic KVM changes, belongs in a separate patch. It'll be
    small, but I want to separate x86's page fault changes from the restrictedmem
    support adding to common KVM.

    This should also short-circuit based on CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM, though
    I would name that CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEMORY since in KVM's world, it's all about
    private vs. shared at this time.

    > + return xa_to_value(xa_load(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn)) &
    > + KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE;
    > +}
    > +#else
    > +static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
    > +{
    > + return false;
    > +}
    > +
    > +#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */
    > +
    > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM
    > +static inline int kvm_restricted_mem_get_pfn(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
    > + gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t *pfn, int *order)
    > +{
    > + int ret;
    > + struct page *page;
    > + pgoff_t index = gfn - slot->base_gfn +
    > + (slot->restricted_offset >> PAGE_SHIFT);
    > +
    > + ret = restrictedmem_get_page(slot->restricted_file, index,
    > + &page, order);

    This needs handle errors. If "ret" is non-zero, "page" is garbage.
    > + *pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
    > + return ret;
    > +}
    > +#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_RESTRICTED_MEM */
    > +
    > #endif
    > --
    > 2.25.1
    >

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