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Subject[ 014/218] Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in getsockopt(BT_SECURITY)
Date
3.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------


From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>

[ Upstream commit 9ad2de43f1aee7e7274a4e0d41465489299e344b ]

The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the key_size member of struct
bt_security before copying it to userland -- that for leaking one
byte kernel stack. Initialize key_size with 0 to avoid the info
leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c
@@ -836,6 +836,7 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct
}

sec.level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level;
+ sec.key_size = 0;

len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len))



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