Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 21 Jun 2023 12:41:01 -0700 | From | Pawan Gupta <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2] x86/bugs: Break down mitigations configurations |
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On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 11:36:53AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote: > On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 10:31:35AM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 08:54:17AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote: > > > On Tue, Jun 20, 2023 at 05:13:27PM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jun 16, 2023 at 09:48:50AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote: > > > > > There is no way to disable MDS, TAA, MMIO Stale data mitigation today at > > > > > compilation time. These mitigations are enabled even if > > > > > CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is unset. > > > > > > > > > > Create a new KCONFIG option for each mitigation under > > > > > CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS that allows these > > > > > mitigations to be disabled by default at compilation time. > > > > > > > > I don't think all mitigations are still controllable at build-time e.g. > > > > spectre_v2 eIBRS mitigation will still be deployed irrespective of the > > > > config. > > > > > > Right. This patchset only cares about MDS, TAA and MMIO. I am more than > > > happy to send a new patch to also disable spectre_v2 eIBRS. > > > > What about Retbleed, L1TF, SRBDS etc? I thought the goal is to control > > all speculation mitigations? > > > > To be consistent CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS should control all > > speculation mitigations. > > If I understand where you want to go, you think we should create a > single patchset that creates a CONFIG_<MITIGATION> for each mitigation, > and move get it under CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS.
Yes, a single series (or a patch) that adds config for each mitigation would be good.
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