Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 21 Jun 2023 11:36:53 -0700 | From | Breno Leitao <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2] x86/bugs: Break down mitigations configurations |
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On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 10:31:35AM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote: > On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 08:54:17AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote: > > On Tue, Jun 20, 2023 at 05:13:27PM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote: > > > On Fri, Jun 16, 2023 at 09:48:50AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote: > > > > There is no way to disable MDS, TAA, MMIO Stale data mitigation today at > > > > compilation time. These mitigations are enabled even if > > > > CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is unset. > > > > > > > > Create a new KCONFIG option for each mitigation under > > > > CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS that allows these > > > > mitigations to be disabled by default at compilation time. > > > > > > I don't think all mitigations are still controllable at build-time e.g. > > > spectre_v2 eIBRS mitigation will still be deployed irrespective of the > > > config. > > > > Right. This patchset only cares about MDS, TAA and MMIO. I am more than > > happy to send a new patch to also disable spectre_v2 eIBRS. > > What about Retbleed, L1TF, SRBDS etc? I thought the goal is to control > all speculation mitigations? > > To be consistent CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS should control all > speculation mitigations.
If I understand where you want to go, you think we should create a single patchset that creates a CONFIG_<MITIGATION> for each mitigation, and move get it under CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS.
Is this what you think we should do?
Thanks!
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