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Subject[tip: x86/urgent] virt/sev-guest: Return -EIO if certificate buffer is not large enough
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID: dd093fb08e8f8a958fec4eef36f9f09eac047f60
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/dd093fb08e8f8a958fec4eef36f9f09eac047f60
Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 22 Feb 2023 10:39:39 -06:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Wed, 01 Mar 2023 10:17:46 +01:00

virt/sev-guest: Return -EIO if certificate buffer is not large enough

Commit

47894e0fa6a5 ("virt/sev-guest: Prevent IV reuse in the SNP guest driver")

changed the behavior associated with the return value when the caller
does not supply a large enough certificate buffer. Prior to the commit a
value of -EIO was returned. Now, 0 is returned. This breaks the
established ABI with the user.

Change the code to detect the buffer size error and return -EIO.

Fixes: 47894e0fa6a5 ("virt/sev-guest: Prevent IV reuse in the SNP guest driver")
Reported-by: Larry Dewey <larry.dewey@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Larry Dewey <larry.dewey@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2afbcae6daf13f7ad5a4296692e0a0fe1bc1e4ee.1677083979.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
---
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 4ec4174..7b4e900 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -377,9 +377,26 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in
snp_dev->input.data_npages = certs_npages;
}

+ /*
+ * Increment the message sequence number. There is no harm in doing
+ * this now because decryption uses the value stored in the response
+ * structure and any failure will wipe the VMPCK, preventing further
+ * use anyway.
+ */
+ snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
+
if (fw_err)
*fw_err = err;

+ /*
+ * If an extended guest request was issued and the supplied certificate
+ * buffer was not large enough, a standard guest request was issued to
+ * prevent IV reuse. If the standard request was successful, return -EIO
+ * back to the caller as would have originally been returned.
+ */
+ if (!rc && err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN)
+ return -EIO;
+
if (rc) {
dev_alert(snp_dev->dev,
"Detected error from ASP request. rc: %d, fw_err: %llu\n",
@@ -395,9 +412,6 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in
goto disable_vmpck;
}

- /* Increment to new message sequence after payload decryption was successful. */
- snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
-
return 0;

disable_vmpck:
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