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SubjectRe: [PATCH RFC v7 10/64] KVM: SEV: Populate private memory fd during LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA
On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 01:40:02PM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
> From: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
>
> This change adds handling of HVA ranges to copy contents

s/This change adds handling of/Handle/

> +static int sev_launch_update_priv_gfn_handler(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
> + struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + struct sev_data_launch_update_data data;
> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> + gfn_t gfn;
> + kvm_pfn_t pfn;
> + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot = range->slot;
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + data.reserved = 0;
> + data.handle = sev->handle;
> +
> + for (gfn = range->start; gfn < range->end; gfn++) {
> + int order;
> + void *kvaddr;
> +
> + ret = kvm_restricted_mem_get_pfn(memslot, gfn, &pfn, &order);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + kvaddr = pfn_to_kaddr(pfn);
> + if (!virt_addr_valid(kvaddr)) {
> + pr_err("Invalid kvaddr 0x%llx\n", (uint64_t)kvaddr);

Is that some debugging help leftover or what is that printk issued for?

> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto e_ret;
> + }
> +
> + ret = kvm_read_guest_page(kvm, gfn, kvaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (ret) {
> + pr_err("guest read failed 0x%x\n", ret);
> + goto e_ret;
> + }
> +
> + if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT))

check_for_deprecated_apis: WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:602: Do not use this_cpu_has() - use cpu_feature_enabled() instead.

> + clflush_cache_range(kvaddr, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> + data.len = PAGE_SIZE;
> + data.address = __sme_set(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
> + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
> + if (ret)
> + goto e_ret;
> + kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
> + }
> + kvm_vm_set_region_attr(kvm, range->start, range->end,
> + true /* priv_attr */);

No need to break that line.

> +
> +e_ret:
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_launch_update_gfn_handler(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range,
> + void *data)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp = (struct kvm_sev_cmd *)data;
> +
> + if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(range->slot))
> + return sev_launch_update_priv_gfn_handler(kvm, range, argp);
> +
> + return sev_launch_update_shared_gfn_handler(kvm, range, argp);
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm,
> + struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
> +
> + if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> + return -ENOTTY;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
> + return -EFAULT;

Not gonna check those user-supplied values for sanity?

Or is this check

if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hva_end <= hva_start))
return -EINVAL;

in kvm_vm_do_hva_range_op() enough?

Thx.

--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

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