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SubjectRe: [PATCH v10 02/19] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations for protected guests
On 14/04/2022 10.02, Claudio Imbrenda wrote:
> With upcoming patches, protected guests will be able to trigger secure
> storage violations in normal operation.
>
> A secure storage violation is triggered when a protected guest tries to
> access secure memory that has been mapped erroneously, or that belongs
> to a different protected guest or to the ultravisor.
>
> With upcoming patches, protected guests will be able to trigger secure
> storage violations in normal operation.

You've already used this sentence as 1st sentence of the patch description.
Looks weird to read it again. Maybe scratch the 1st sentence?

> This happens for example if a
> protected guest is rebooted with lazy destroy enabled and the new guest
> is also protected.
>
> When the new protected guest touches pages that have not yet been
> destroyed, and thus are accounted to the previous protected guest, a
> secure storage violation is raised.
>
> This patch adds handling of secure storage violations for protected
> guests.
>
> This exception is handled by first trying to destroy the page, because
> it is expected to belong to a defunct protected guest where a destroy
> should be possible. If that fails, a normal export of the page is
> attempted.
>
> Therefore, pages that trigger the exception will be made non-secure
> before attempting to use them again for a different secure guest.

I'm an complete ignorant here, but isn't this somewhat dangerous? Could it
happen that a VM could destroy/export the pages of another secure guest that
way?

Thomas

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