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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2 02/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack
On Thu, Sep 29, 2022 at 03:28:59PM -0700, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
>
> Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
> corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
> CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built for the
> feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is
> enabled, legacy non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without
> protection.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>
> ---
>
> v2:
> - Remove already wrong kernel size increase info (tlgx)
> - Change prompt to remove "Intel" (tglx)
> - Update line about what CPUs are supported (Dave)
>
> Yu-cheng v25:
> - Remove X86_CET and use X86_SHADOW_STACK directly.
>
> Yu-cheng v24:
> - Update for the splitting X86_CET to X86_SHADOW_STACK and X86_IBT.
>
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
> 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index f9920f1341c8..b68eb75887b8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ config X86_64
> depends on 64BIT
> # Options that are inherently 64-bit kernel only:
> select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
> + select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
> select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128
> select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
> select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
> @@ -1936,6 +1937,23 @@ config X86_SGX
>
> If unsure, say N.
>
> +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
> + def_bool n
> +
> +config X86_SHADOW_STACK
> + prompt "X86 Shadow Stack"
> + def_bool n

I hope we can switch this to "default y" soon, given it's a hardware
feature that is disabled at runtime when not available.

> + depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK

Doesn't this depend on AS_WRUSS too?

> + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
> + help
> + Shadow Stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
> + return address corruption. Today the kernel's support is limited to
> + virtualizing it in KVM guests.
> +
> + CPUs supporting shadow stacks were first released in 2020.
> +
> + If unsure, say N.
> +
> config EFI
> bool "EFI runtime service support"
> depends on ACPI
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
> index 26b8c08e2fc4..00c79dd93651 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
> @@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ config AS_TPAUSE
> def_bool $(as-instr,tpause %ecx)
> help
> Supported by binutils >= 2.31.1 and LLVM integrated assembler >= V7
> +
> +config AS_WRUSS
> + def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx))
> + help
> + Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler

Otherwise, I don't see anything else using OCNFIG_AS_WRUSS:

$ git grep AS_WRUSS
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler:config AS_WRUSS

-Kees

--
Kees Cook

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