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Subject[PATCH] crypto: ecdh_helper - Ensure 'len >= secret.len' in decode_key()
Date
From: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com>

The length ('len' parameter) passed to crypto_ecdh_decode_key() is never
checked against the length encoded in the passed buffer ('buf'
parameter). This could lead to an out-of-bounds access when the passed
length is less than the encoded length.

Add a check to prevent that.

Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com>
---
crypto/ecdh_helper.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/ecdh_helper.c b/crypto/ecdh_helper.c
index 66fcb2ea8154..fca63b559f65 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdh_helper.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh_helper.c
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ int crypto_ecdh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len,
if (secret.type != CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_ECDH)
return -EINVAL;

+ if (unlikely(len < secret.len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(&params->curve_id, ptr, sizeof(params->curve_id));
ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(&params->key_size, ptr, sizeof(params->key_size));
if (secret.len != crypto_ecdh_key_len(params))
--
2.26.2
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