Messages in this thread | | | From | Yu-cheng Yu <> | Subject | [PATCH v12 0/8] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking | Date | Fri, 18 Sep 2020 12:23:04 -0700 |
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Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
This is the second part of CET and enables Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT). It is built on top of the shadow stack series.
Changes in v12:
- Replace obj file list with $(vobjs) $(vobjs32) in VDSO Makefile. - Disable vsyscall emulation only when it is attempted. - Split out ptrace patch.
[1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32- architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4
[2] Indirect Branch Tracking patches v11.
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200825002645.3658-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/
H.J. Lu (3): x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO
Yu-cheng Yu (5): x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled
arch/x86/Kconfig | 18 ++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 4 ++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/system_call.S | 3 + arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 8 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 17 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 8 ++- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 8 +++ .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 ++- 12 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-- 2.21.0
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