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SubjectRe: TDX #VE in SYSCALL gap (was: [RFD] x86: Curing the exception and syscall trainwreck in hardware)
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On 8/25/20 10:59 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> If I've read the TDX spec/whitepaper properly, the main hypervisor can
> write to all the encrypted pages.  This will destroy data, break the
> MAC, and yields #PF inside the SEAM hypervisor, or the TD when the cache
> line is next referenced.

I think you're talking about:

> Attempting to access a private KeyID by software outside the SEAM
> mode would cause a page-fault exception (#PF).

I don't think that ever results in a TD guest #PF. "A MAC-verification
failure would be fatal to the TD and lead to its termination." In this
context, I think that means that the TD stops running and can not be
reentered.

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