Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: TDX #VE in SYSCALL gap (was: [RFD] x86: Curing the exception and syscall trainwreck in hardware) | From | Dave Hansen <> | Date | Tue, 25 Aug 2020 11:38:31 -0700 |
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On 8/25/20 10:59 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote: > If I've read the TDX spec/whitepaper properly, the main hypervisor can > write to all the encrypted pages. This will destroy data, break the > MAC, and yields #PF inside the SEAM hypervisor, or the TD when the cache > line is next referenced.
I think you're talking about:
> Attempting to access a private KeyID by software outside the SEAM > mode would cause a page-fault exception (#PF).
I don't think that ever results in a TD guest #PF. "A MAC-verification failure would be fatal to the TD and lead to its termination." In this context, I think that means that the TD stops running and can not be reentered.
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