Messages in this thread | | | From | "Luck, Tony" <> | Subject | RE: TDX #VE in SYSCALL gap (was: [RFD] x86: Curing the exception and syscall trainwreck in hardware) | Date | Tue, 25 Aug 2020 17:35:29 +0000 |
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> > Or malicious hypervisor action, and that's a problem. > > > > Suppose the hypervisor remaps a GPA used in the SYSCALL gap (e.g. the > > actual SYSCALL text or the first memory it accesses -- I don't have a > > TDX spec so I don't know the details).
Is it feasible to defend against a malicious (or buggy) hypervisor?
Obviously, we can't leave holes that guests can exploit. But the hypervisor can crash the system no matter how clever TDX is.
-Tony
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