lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2020]   [Aug]   [10]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
From
SubjectRE: [PATCH 19/22] crypto: inside-secure - add check for xts input length equal to zero
Date
> -----Original Message-----
> From: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org <linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org> On Behalf Of Andrei Botila
> Sent: Friday, August 7, 2020 6:20 PM
> To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>; David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org; linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org;
> linux-s390@vger.kernel.org; x86@kernel.org; linux-arm-kernel@axis.com; Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com>; Antoine Tenart
> <antoine.tenart@bootlin.com>
> Subject: [PATCH 19/22] crypto: inside-secure - add check for xts input length equal to zero
>
> <<< External Email >>>
> From: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com>
>
> Standardize the way input lengths equal to 0 are handled in all skcipher
> algorithms. All the algorithms return 0 for input lengths equal to zero.
>
> Cc: Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@bootlin.com>
> Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
> index 1ac3253b7903..03d06556ea98 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
> @@ -2533,6 +2533,9 @@ static int safexcel_skcipher_aes_xts_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
>
> static int safexcel_encrypt_xts(struct skcipher_request *req)
> {
> +if (!req->cryptlen)
> +return 0;
> +
> if (req->cryptlen < XTS_BLOCK_SIZE)
> return -EINVAL;
> return safexcel_queue_req(&req->base, skcipher_request_ctx(req),
> @@ -2541,6 +2544,9 @@ static int safexcel_encrypt_xts(struct skcipher_request *req)
>
> static int safexcel_decrypt_xts(struct skcipher_request *req)
> {
> +if (!req->cryptlen)
> +return 0;
> +
> if (req->cryptlen < XTS_BLOCK_SIZE)
> return -EINVAL;
> return safexcel_queue_req(&req->base, skcipher_request_ctx(req),
> --
> 2.17.1

With all due respect, but this makes no sense.

For XTS, any length below 16 is illegal, as applying CTS in order to handle non-cipher
block multiples (16 bytes in case of AES) requires _more_ data than 1 cipher block.

There is no benefit to explicitly check for zero length if there is already a check for
less-than-16. That's just wasting CPU cycles and a branch predictor entry, for no
benefit whatsoever. (except for academic "alignment with other ciphers").

XTS has very specific use cases. No one in their right mind would call it for a
situation where it can't be applied in the first place, e.g. anything < 16 bytes.

Regards,
Pascal van Leeuwen
Silicon IP Architect Multi-Protocol Engines, Rambus Security
Rambus ROTW Holding BV
+31-73 6581953

Note: The Inside Secure/Verimatrix Silicon IP team was recently acquired by Rambus.
Please be so kind to update your e-mail address book with my new e-mail address.


** This message and any attachments are for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). It may contain information that is confidential and privileged. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you are prohibited from printing, copying, forwarding or saving it. Please delete the message and attachments and notify the sender immediately. **

Rambus Inc.<http://www.rambus.com>

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2020-08-10 12:29    [W:0.155 / U:0.196 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site