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Subject[PATCH v2] x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
Date
The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace
via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation
of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The idx can be controlled from:
ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.

Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index p->thread.tls_array.

Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/tls.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index a5b802a..424cff5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/regset.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>

#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
struct user_desc __user *u_info)
{
struct user_desc info;
+ int index;

if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -227,8 +229,9 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;

- fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
- &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
+ index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
+
+ fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);

if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
--
2.7.4
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