Messages in this thread | | | From | Linus Torvalds <> | Date | Sun, 6 Jan 2019 11:18:05 -0800 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()' |
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[ Re-sending the message because my first reply bounced - Guenther had mis-typed the lkml address ]
On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 10:09 AM Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> wrote: > > All alpha and sh4 (big and little endian) images fail to boot in qemu > with this patch applied. Reverting it fixes the problem.
Funky. 99% of that patch is a complete no-op on non-x86.
The one exception is the strncpy_from_user() and strnlen_user() cases, which didn't use to do access_ok() at all, and now essentially do.
But I think I see what may be the problem. I think the alpha version of "access_ok()" is buggy.
Lookie here:
#define __access_ok(addr, size) \ ((get_fs().seg & (addr | size | (addr+size))) == 0)
and what it basically tests is of any of the high bits get set (the USER_DS value is 0xfffffc0000000000).
And that's completely wrong for the "addr+size" check. It's off-by-one for the case where we check to the very end of the user address space, which is exactly what the strn*_user() functions do.
Why? Because "addr+size" will be exactly the size of the address space, so trying to access the last byte of the user address space will *fail* the __access_ok() check, even though it shouldn't.
So it's not really that that commit is buggy in itself, but it triggers that off-by-one error in access_ok().
Side note: that alpha macro is buggy for another reason too: it re-uses the arguments twice.
And SH has almost the exact same bug:
#define __addr_ok(addr) \ ((unsigned long __force)(addr) < current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg)
so far so good: yes, a user address must be below the limit. But then:
#define __access_ok(addr, size) \ (__addr_ok((addr) + (size)))
is wrong with the exact same off-by-one case: the case when "addr+size" is exactly _equal_ to the limit is actually perfectly fine.
The SH version is actually seriously buggy in another way: it doesn't actually check for overflow, even though it did copy the _comment_ that talks about overflow.
So it turns out that both SH and alpha actually have completely buggered implementations of access_ok(), but they happened to work (although the SH overflow one is a serious serious security bug, not that anybody likely cares about SH security)
Ho humm.
Maybe something like the attached patch? Entirely untested, I don't have a cross-build environment, much less a boot setup.
It isn't trying to be clever, the end address is based on this logic:
unsigned long __ao_end = __ao_a + __ao_b - !!__ao_b; \
which basically says "subtract one unless the length was zero".
For a lot of access_ok() users the length is a constant, so this isn't actually as expensive as it initially looks.
Does that fix things for you?
Linus [unhandled content-type:application/x-patch] | |