Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 20 Sep 2018 10:00:53 +0200 | From | Peter Zijlstra <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Provide application property based STIBP protection |
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On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 02:35:30PM -0700, Tim Chen wrote: > This patch provides an application property based spectre_v2 > protection with STIBP against attack from another app from > a sibling hyper-thread. For security sensitive non-dumpable > app, STIBP will be turned on before switching to it for Intel > processors vulnerable to spectre_v2.
Why does that non dumpable thing make sense? Why not use the same prctl() we already use for SSBD?
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