Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 2 Oct 2018 17:43:16 +0200 (CEST) | From | Jiri Kosina <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Provide application property based STIBP protection |
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On Tue, 2 Oct 2018, Jon Masters wrote:
> > This patch provides an application property based spectre_v2 > > protection with STIBP against attack from another app from > > a sibling hyper-thread. For security sensitive non-dumpable > > app, STIBP will be turned on before switching to it for Intel > > processors vulnerable to spectre_v2. > > A general comment. I think in practice this will be similar to the > speculative store buffer bypass (aka "variant 4") issue in terms of > opt-in mitigation. Many users won't want to take the performance hit of > having STIBP by default for peer threads. We should make sure that we > don't force users into a mitigation but retain an option. Whether it's > default-on or not can be debated, though I think the vendors lean toward > having default-off with an opt-in, and customers will probably agree. So > anyway, I encourage a pragmatic approach similar to that for SSBD.
Which is what Tim's patchset is implementing on top.
Thanks,
-- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
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