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SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/1 v2] x86: pkey-mprotect must allow pkey-0
On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 10:51:26AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 03/14/2018 10:14 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> > I look at key-0 as 'the key'. It has special status.
> > (a) It always exist.
> Do you mean "is always allocated"?

always allocated and cannot be freed. Hence always exists.

If we let it freed, than yes 'it is always allocated', but
may not 'always exist'.

> > (b) it cannot be freed.
> This is the one I'm questioning.

this is a philosophical question. Should we allow the application
shoot-its-own-feet or help it from doing so. I tend to
gravitate towards the later.

> > (c) it is assigned by default.
> I agree on this totally. :)

good. we have some common ground :)

> > (d) its permissions cannot be modified.
> Why not? You could pretty easily get a thread going that had its stack
> covered with another pkey and that was being very careful what it
> accesses. It could pretty easily set pkey-0's access or write-disable bits.

ok. I see your point. Will not argue against it.

> > (e) it bypasses key-permission checks when assigned.
> I don't think this is necessary. I think the only rule we *need* is:
> pkey-0 is allocated implicitly at execve() time. You do not
> need to call pkey_alloc() to allocate it.

And can be explicitly associated with any address range ?

> > An arch need not necessarily map 'the key-0' to its key-0. It could
> > internally map it to any of its internal key of its choice, transparent
> > to the application.
> I don't understand what you are saying here.

I was trying to disassociate the notion that "application's key-0
means hardware's key-0". Nevermind. its not important for this

Ram Pai

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