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SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/1 v2] x86: pkey-mprotect must allow pkey-0
On 03/14/2018 10:14 AM, Ram Pai wrote:
> I look at key-0 as 'the key'. It has special status.
> (a) It always exist.

Do you mean "is always allocated"?

> (b) it cannot be freed.

This is the one I'm questioning.

> (c) it is assigned by default.

I agree on this totally. :)

> (d) its permissions cannot be modified.

Why not? You could pretty easily get a thread going that had its stack
covered with another pkey and that was being very careful what it
accesses. It could pretty easily set pkey-0's access or write-disable bits.

> (e) it bypasses key-permission checks when assigned.

I don't think this is necessary. I think the only rule we *need* is:

pkey-0 is allocated implicitly at execve() time. You do not
need to call pkey_alloc() to allocate it.

> An arch need not necessarily map 'the key-0' to its key-0. It could
> internally map it to any of its internal key of its choice, transparent
> to the application.

I don't understand what you are saying here.

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