| Subject | Re: [PATCH 14/18] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution | From | Sergei Shtylyov <> | Date | Sat, 6 Jan 2018 13:04:52 +0300 |
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On 1/6/2018 4:11 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value > that is used as a data dependency reading from a raw_frag_vec buffer. > In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block > speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further > reads based on an invalid '*(rfv->c + offset)' value. > > Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. > > Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> > Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> > Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> > Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> > --- > net/ipv4/raw.c | 9 +++++---- > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c > index 125c1eab3eaa..f72b20131a15 100644 > --- a/net/ipv4/raw.c > +++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c [...] > @@ -472,17 +473,17 @@ static int raw_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd, > struct sk_buff *skb) > { > struct raw_frag_vec *rfv = from; > + char *rfv_buf; > > - if (offset < rfv->hlen) { > + if ((rfv_buf = nospec_array_ptr(rfv->hdr.c, offset, rfv->hlen))) {
And here...
[...]
MBR, Sergei
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