| Date | Sat, 6 Jan 2018 10:00:19 +0100 | From | Greg KH <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 14/18] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution |
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On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 05:11:10PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value > that is used as a data dependency reading from a raw_frag_vec buffer. > In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block > speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further > reads based on an invalid '*(rfv->c + offset)' value. > > Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.
I thought we "proved" that this patch was not needed at all, based on previous review. It doesn't look like that review cycle got incorporated into this patch series at all, I guess I have to go back and do it all again :(
thanks,
greg k-h
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