Messages in this thread |  | | From | David Drysdale <> | Subject | [PATCHv4 RESEND 0/3] syscalls,x86: Add execveat() system call | Date | Thu, 5 Jun 2014 14:40:32 +0100 |
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Resending, adding cc:linux-api.
Also, it may help to add a little more background -- this patch is needed as a (small) part of implementing Capsicum in the Linux kernel.
Capsicum is a security framework that has been present in FreeBSD since version 9.0 (Jan 2012), and is based on concepts from object-capability security [1].
One of the features of Capsicum is capability mode, which locks down access to global namespaces such as the filesystem hierarchy. In capability mode, /proc is thus inaccessible and so fexecve(3) doesn't work -- hence the need for a kernel-space alternative.
[1] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/capsicum/papers/2010usenix-security-capsicum-website.pdf
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This patch set adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528).
The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem. The current glibc version of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed or otherwise restricted environments.
Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested (https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be an appropriate generalization.
Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without back-compatibility concerns. The current implementation just defines the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag, but other flags could be added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474).
Related history: - https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment. - http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to "prevent other people from wasting their time". - https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=74481 documented that it's not possible to fexecve() a file descriptor for a script with close-on-exec set (which is possible with the implementation here). - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve() because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since been fixed.
Changes since Meredydd's v3 patch: - Added a selftest. - Added a man page. - Left open_exec() signature untouched to reduce patch impact elsewhere (as suggested by Al Viro). - Filled in bprm->filename with d_path() into a buffer, to avoid use of potentially-ephemeral dentry->d_name. - Patch against v3.14 (455c6fdbd21916).
David Drysdale (2): syscalls,x86: implement execveat() system call syscalls,x86: add selftest for execveat(2)
arch/x86/ia32/audit.c | 1 + arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 28 ++++ arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 + arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 1 + fs/exec.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/compat.h | 3 + include/linux/sched.h | 4 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 4 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +- kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 + lib/audit.c | 3 + tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore | 6 + tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile | 32 ++++ tools/testing/selftests/exec/execveat.c | 251 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 18 files changed, 476 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/exec/execveat.c
-- 1.9.1.423.g4596e3a
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