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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2] ceph: fix posix ACL hooks
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On Mon, Feb 3, 2014 at 1:39 PM, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>
> If we really have hardlinks, the result of permission check would better
> be a function of inode itself - as in, "if it gives different results
> for two pathnames reachable for the same user, we have a bug".

No. You're wrong.

EVEN ON A UNIX FILESYSTEM THE PATH IS MEANINGFUL.

Do this: create a hardlink in two different directories. Make the
*directory* permissions for one of the directories be something you
cannot traverse. Now try to check the permissions of the *same* inode
through those two paths. Notice how you get *different* results.

Really.

Now, imagine that you are doing the same thing over a network. On the
server, there may be a single inode for the file, but when the client
gives the server a pathname, the two pathnames to that single inode
ARE NOT EQUIVALENT.

And the fact is, filesystems with hardlinks and path-name-based
operations do exist. cifs with the unix extensions is one of them.

Al, face it, you're wrong this time.

Linus


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