Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 4 Apr 2013 13:23:41 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR | From | Julien Tinnes <> |
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On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:19 PM, Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> wrote: > On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:12 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote: >> On 04/04/2013 01:07 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> However, the benefits of >>> this feature in certain environments exceed the perceived weaknesses[2]. >> >> Could you clarify? > > I think privilege reduction in general, and sandboxing in particular, > can make KASLR even more useful. A lot of the information leaks can be > mitigated in the same way as attack surface and vulnerabilities can be > mitigated.
Case in point: - leaks of 64 bits kernel values to userland in compatibility sub-mode. Sandboxing by using seccomp-bpf can restrict a process to the 64-bit mode API. - restricting access to the syslog() system call
Julien
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