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SubjectRe: [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR
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On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 3:08 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote:
> On 04/05/2013 03:06 PM, Julien Tinnes wrote:
>>
>> Speaking of IDT, and to capture some off-thread discussion here, we
>> should remember that the "SGDT" and "SIDT" instructions aren't
>> privileged on x86, so user-land can leak these out without any way for
>> the kernel to intercept that.
>>
>> Adding their own random offsets to these two tables would be very
>> useful. This could be done in a later patchset of course.
>>
>
> Yes, if the GDT or IDT position is at all correlated to the kernel
> position this is pointless.

Let's say it's less useful :) Remote attacks and from-inside-a-VM
attack would still be mitigated.

Julien


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