| Date | Mon, 17 Sep 2012 01:37:26 +0100 | From | Ben Hutchings <> | Subject | [ 061/135] Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in getsockopt(BT_SECURITY) |
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3.2-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit 9ad2de43f1aee7e7274a4e0d41465489299e344b ]
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the key_size member of struct bt_security before copying it to userland -- that for leaking one byte kernel stack. Initialize key_size with 0 to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> --- net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c index 5417f61..03584bc 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c @@ -835,6 +835,7 @@ static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, c } sec.level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level; + sec.key_size = 0; len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec)); if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len))
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