Messages in this thread | | | From | (Eric W. Biederman) | Date | Fri, 02 Nov 2012 15:03:02 -0700 | Subject | Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support |
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Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> writes:
> On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 01:49:25AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > >> When the goal is to secure Linux I don't see how any of this helps. >> Windows 8 compromises are already available so if we turn most of these >> arguments around I am certain clever attackers can go through windows to >> run compromised kernel on a linux system, at least as easily as the >> reverse. > > And if any of them are used to attack Linux, we'd expect those versions > of Windows to be blacklisted.
I fail to see the logic here. It is ok to trust Microsofts signing key because after I have been p0wned they will blacklist the version of windows that has was used to compromise my system?
A key revokation will help me when my system is p0wned how?
I don't want my system p0wned in the first place and I don't want to run windows. Why should I trust Microsoft's signing key?
Eric
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