Messages in this thread | ![/](/images/icornerl.gif) | | Date | Thu, 12 Jan 2012 17:30:48 +0000 | From | Jamie Lokier <> | Subject | Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF |
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Steven Rostedt wrote: > On Thu, 2012-01-12 at 17:14 +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote: > > > May be this needs something like LSM_UNSAFE_SECCOMP, or perhaps > > cap_bprm_set_creds() should take seccomp.mode == 2 into account, I dunno. > > > > OTOH, currently seccomp.mode == 1 doesn't allow to exec at all. > > I've never used seccomp, so I admit I'm totally ignorant on this topic. > > But looking at seccomp from the outside, the biggest advantage to this > would be the ability for normal processes to be able to limit tasks it > kicks off. If I want to run a task in a sandbox, I don't want to be root > to do so. > > I guess a web browser doesn't perform an exec to run java programs.
Actually it does. Firefox on Linux forks and execs the Java VM. Same for Flash, using "plugin-container".
> But it would be nice if I could execute something from the command > line that I could run in a sand box.
You can do this now, using ptrace(). It's horrible, but half of the horribleness is needing to understand machine-dependent registers, which this new patch doesn't address. (The other half is a ton of undocumented but important ptrace() behaviours on Linux.)
-- Jamie
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