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    SubjectRe: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
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    On Thu, 2012-01-12 at 17:14 +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:

    > May be this needs something like LSM_UNSAFE_SECCOMP, or perhaps
    > cap_bprm_set_creds() should take seccomp.mode == 2 into account, I dunno.
    >
    > OTOH, currently seccomp.mode == 1 doesn't allow to exec at all.

    I've never used seccomp, so I admit I'm totally ignorant on this topic.

    But looking at seccomp from the outside, the biggest advantage to this
    would be the ability for normal processes to be able to limit tasks it
    kicks off. If I want to run a task in a sandbox, I don't want to be root
    to do so.

    I guess a web browser doesn't perform an exec to run java programs. But
    it would be nice if I could execute something from the command line that
    I could run in a sand box.

    What's the problem with making sure that the setuid isn't set before
    doing an execv? Only fail when setuid (or some other magic) is enabled
    on the file being exec'd.

    Or is this a race where I can have a soft link pointing to a normal
    file, run this, and have the link change to a setuid file at just the
    right time that causes it to happen?


    -- Steve




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