Messages in this thread | | | From | Bodo Eggert <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH RFC] Restrictions on module loading | Date | Mon, 08 Nov 2010 09:30:50 +0100 |
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Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> wrote:
> The below patch replaces the existing "modules_disable" sysctl with a > finer-grained "modules_restrict" sysctl. By default, this is set at 0, > which results in no deviation from normal module loading behavior. When > set to 1, unprivileged users cannot trigger the automatic loading of > modules. This behavior is based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN > setting. The current check is against current_uid(), since several > distributions explicitly remove CAP_SYS_MODULE from root processes, some > of which incidentally cause (and rely on) the automatic loading of > modules. I expect this to be a point of discussion.
- Why don't you offer both?
- What about task switches or work queues?
- It might be more like the expected behavior if you'd used: 0: off, 1: modules completely disabled, 2: CAP_SYS_MODULE, 3: uid==0
Many users will forget to look into the documentation or find the current, stale documentation or just assume a boolean value.
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