Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] | From | Stephen Smalley <> | Date | Mon, 10 Dec 2007 16:27:48 -0500 |
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On Mon, 2007-12-10 at 21:08 +0000, David Howells wrote: > Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > > > Otherwise, only other issue I have with this interface is it won't > > generalize to dealing with nfsd, where we want to set the acting context > > to a context we obtain from or determine based upon the client. > > Are you speaking of security_kernel_act_as() and security_create_files_as() > specifically? Or the task_struct::act_as override pointer in general?
security_kernel_act_as()
> I don't really know how nfsd wants to obtain and set its LSM context, so it's > a bit difficult for me to make something that works for nfsd as well as > cachefiles.
It would get a context from the client or from a local configuration that would map security-unaware clients to a default context, and then want to assume that context for the particular operation. No transition involved.
> > Why can't cachefilesd just push a context into the kernel and pass that > > into the hook as the acting context, > > How does cachefilesd come up with such a context? Grab it from > /etc/cachefilesd.conf?
>From a config file whose pathname would be provided by libselinux (ala the way in which dbusd imports contexts), or directly as a context returned by a libselinux function. Has to be done that way so that it can be set differently for different policy types (strict, targeted, mls).
Naturally, cachefiles (the kernel module) would invoke a security hook to check whether the daemon is allowed to set the specified context.
> I use to do that, but someone objected... Possibly Karl MacMillan.
Yes, but I think I disagreed then too.
> > and then nfsd can do likewise using the context provided by the client or > > obtained locally from exports for ordinary clients? Avoids the transition > > SID computation altogether within the kernel and makes this more generic. > > I seem to remember that I was told that it should be done this way, possibly > by Karl MacMillan, but I don't remember exactly. > > Now it's configured by cachefilesd.te: > > type_transition cachefilesd_t kernel_t : process cachefiles_kernel_t;
It doesn't fit with how other users of security_kernel_act_as() will likely want to work (they will want to just set the context to a specified value, whether one obtained from the client or from some local source), nor with how type transitions normally work (exec, with the program type as the second type field). I think it will just cause confusion and subtle breakage.
-- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency
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