Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 25 Oct 2007 20:45:31 -0700 (PDT) | From | david@lang ... | Subject | Re: Linux Security *Module* Framework (Was: LSM conversion to static interface) |
| |
On Thu, 25 Oct 2007, Alan Cox wrote:
>>> There is a ton of evidence both in computing and outside of it which >>> shows that poor security can be very much worse than no security at all. >> >> (So, I take it that you *don't* lock your bike up, as poor security is >> worse than none?) > > On the contrary because I know it is not secure I would > > a) Insure it
and the unsurance company would have a clause in the policy that wouldn't cover you unless you used a lock, becouse they recognise that while it wouldn't stop everyone there is a large group of potential thieves that it would stop.
> b) Not waste vast amounts of money on a useless expensive lock
who said the lock was expensive? and while you are not willing to spend money on a lock you are willing to spend (much more) money on an insurance policy.
David Lang
> c) Make sure the bike looked not worth stealing > d) Take the saddle with me > > (or the software versions of that > > a) Keep backups > b) Not waste vast amounts of money on bogus security software > c) Keep the system looking uninteresting > d) Encrypt the data) > >> 'Inappropriate risks' nowadays is surfing the web and opening up mail >> attachments that claim to be movies of dancing bears. I'd argue that >> users have a reasonable expectation that these are things that should >> 'just work,' and be safe, much as normal humans have an expectation >> that their car isn't going to explode when they turn the ignition. > > Yes and its very clear from the things said by politicians that if the > computer software people don't do this soon, the legislators will make > very sure they do by stripping away all the techniques used to hide from > liability for failure. > >> Perfect is the enemy of good, or words to that effect, right? My point >> is that requiring perfection out of a security framework is a bar >> that's going to be awfully difficult to reach (and when it supposedly >> has been achieved, as in SELinux, mere mortals find it too troublesome >> to run with as it's far too difficult to configure). Security can and >> should be done in layers, and what one may miss, another may catch. > > Absolutely - but those layers should do whatever they do *right* and > really do it, whether they are complex whole system controls like SELinux > or simple network security tools. > > Alan > - > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ > - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
| |