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SubjectRe: malware defense
How can you rely only on an authentication method as a root intruder could
obtain private keys by reading kernel space/kernel binary/module binary or
even could overwrite signatures base with his own module signature, even
if it is in kernel space ?

I think deactivating /dev/kmem is a first step for all concerning kernel
memory (am I right ? Do I forget strange mmap uses or other hacks
coming from outer space ?)

Anyway, if you try to protect some sensitive machines like firewalls or
web servers or db servers, I think you can forget using dynamic module
insertion features. It's a good and simple mean to be sure no one have
inserted bad modules.


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