Messages in this thread | | | From | Amir Goldstein <> | Date | Wed, 31 Jan 2024 15:25:29 +0200 | Subject | Re: [PATCH 1/5] security: allow finer granularity in permitting copy-up of security xattrs |
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On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 11:46 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > Copying up xattrs is solely based on the security xattr name. For finer > granularity add a dentry parameter to the security_inode_copy_up_xattr > hook definition, allowing decisions to be based on the xattr content as > well. > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> > --- > fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +- > include/linux/evm.h | 2 +- > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 ++- > include/linux/security.h | 4 ++-- > security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 2 +- > security/security.c | 7 ++++--- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- > 8 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c > index b8e25ca51016..bd9ddcefb7a7 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c > @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int ovl_copy_xattr(struct super_block *sb, const struct path *oldpath, struct de > if (ovl_is_private_xattr(sb, name)) > continue; > > - error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name); > + error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(old, name);
What do you think about:
error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name, NULL, 0);
and then later...
error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name, value, size);
I am asking because overlayfs uses mnt_idmap(path->mnt) and you have used nop_mnt_idmap inside evm hook. this does not look right to me?
Thanks, Amir.
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