| Date | Wed, 9 Aug 2023 10:05:30 -0400 | From | Josh Poimboeuf <> | Subject | Re: [RFC][PATCH 11/17] x86/cpu: Remove all SRSO interface nonsense |
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On Wed, Aug 09, 2023 at 09:12:29AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > @@ -2607,26 +2447,26 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *bu > static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) > { > if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || > + retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET_SRSO || > + retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET_SRSO_ALIAS || > retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {
These retbleed_show_state() changes probably belong in that other patch which adds the retbleed= cmdline options.
> + > if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && > boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) > return sysfs_emit(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n"); > > - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation], > + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation], > !sched_smt_active() ? "disabled" : > spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || > spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ? > - "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable"); > - } > + "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable", > + cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no SRSO microcode");
Hm? What does missing microcode have to do with SMT?
-- Josh
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