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SubjectRe: [PATCH v1] xfrm: add forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH
On Sun, Jul 23, 2023 at 03:41:10PM +0800, Lin Ma wrote:
> The previous commit 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change
> message to user space") added one additional attribute named
> XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH and described its type at compat_policy
> (net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c).
>
> However, the author forgot to also describe the nla_policy at
> xfrma_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c). Hence, this suppose NLA_U32 (4
> bytes) value can be faked as empty (0 bytes) by a malicious user, which
> leads to 4 bytes overflow read and heap information leak when parsing
> nlattrs.
>
> To exploit this, one malicious user can spray the SLUB objects and then
> leverage this 4 bytes OOB read to leak the heap data into
> x->mapping_maxage (see xfrm_update_ae_params(...)), and leak it to
> userspace via copy_to_user_state_extra(...).
>
> The above bug is assigned CVE-2023-3773. To fix it, this commit just
> completes the nla_policy description for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH, which
> enforces the length check and avoids such OOB read.
>
> Fixes: 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space")
> Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>

Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>

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