Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 10 May 2023 16:54:12 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] bpf: reject blacklisted symbols in kprobe_multi to avoid recursive trap | From | Yonghong Song <> |
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On 5/10/23 1:20 PM, Yonghong Song wrote: > > > On 5/10/23 10:27 AM, Jiri Olsa wrote: >> On Wed, May 10, 2023 at 07:13:58AM -0700, Yonghong Song wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 5/10/23 5:20 AM, Ze Gao wrote: >>>> BPF_LINK_TYPE_KPROBE_MULTI attaches kprobe programs through fprobe, >>>> however it does not takes those kprobe blacklisted into consideration, >>>> which likely introduce recursive traps and blows up stacks. >>>> >>>> this patch adds simple check and remove those are in kprobe_blacklist >>>> from one fprobe during bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach. And also >>>> check_kprobe_address_safe is open for more future checks. >>>> >>>> note that ftrace provides recursion detection mechanism, but for kprobe >>>> only, we can directly reject those cases early without turning to >>>> ftrace. >>>> >>>> Signed-off-by: Ze Gao <zegao@tencent.com> >>>> --- >>>> kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>>> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+) >>>> >>>> diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c >>>> index 9a050e36dc6c..44c68bc06bbd 100644 >>>> --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c >>>> +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c >>>> @@ -2764,6 +2764,37 @@ static int get_modules_for_addrs(struct >>>> module ***mods, unsigned long *addrs, u3 >>>> return arr.mods_cnt; >>>> } >>>> +static inline int check_kprobe_address_safe(unsigned long addr) >>>> +{ >>>> + if (within_kprobe_blacklist(addr)) >>>> + return -EINVAL; >>>> + else >>>> + return 0; >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> +static int check_bpf_kprobe_addrs_safe(unsigned long *addrs, int num) >>>> +{ >>>> + int i, cnt; >>>> + char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN]; >>>> + >>>> + for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { >>>> + if (check_kprobe_address_safe((unsigned long)addrs[i])) { >>>> + lookup_symbol_name(addrs[i], symname); >>>> + pr_warn("bpf_kprobe: %s at %lx is blacklisted\n", >>>> symname, addrs[i]); >>> >>> So user request cannot be fulfilled and a warning is issued and some >>> of user requests are discarded and the rest is proceeded. Does not >>> sound a good idea. >>> >>> Maybe we should do filtering in user space, e.g., in libbpf, check >>> /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/blacklist and return error >>> earlier? bpftrace/libbpf-tools/bcc-tools all do filtering before >>> requesting kprobe in the kernel. >> >> also fprobe uses ftrace drectly without paths in kprobe, so I wonder >> some of the kprobe blacklisted functions are actually safe > > Could you give a pointer about 'some of the kprobe blacklisted > functions are actually safe'?
Thanks Jiri for answering my question. it is not clear whether kprobe blacklist == fprobe blacklist, probably not.
You mentioned: note that ftrace provides recursion detection mechanism, but for kprobe only Maybe the right choice is to improve ftrace to provide recursion detection mechanism for fprobe as well?
> >> >> jirka >> >>> >>>> + /* mark blacklisted symbol for remove */ >>>> + addrs[i] = 0; >>>> + } >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + /* remove blacklisted symbol from addrs */ >>>> + for (i = 0, cnt = 0; i < num; ++i) { >>>> + if (addrs[i]) >>>> + addrs[cnt++] = addrs[i]; >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + return cnt; >>>> +} >>>> + >>>> int bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, >>>> struct bpf_prog *prog) >>>> { >>>> struct bpf_kprobe_multi_link *link = NULL; >>>> @@ -2859,6 +2890,12 @@ int bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(const union >>>> bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *pr >>>> else >>>> link->fp.entry_handler = kprobe_multi_link_handler; >>>> + cnt = check_bpf_kprobe_addrs_safe(addrs, cnt); >>>> + if (!cnt) { >>>> + err = -EINVAL; >>>> + goto error; >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> link->addrs = addrs; >>>> link->cookies = cookies; >>>> link->cnt = cnt;
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