Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 25 Apr 2023 09:47:22 +0800 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2] mm: hwpoison: coredump: support recovery from dump_user_range() | From | Kefeng Wang <> |
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On 2023/4/25 0:17, Luck, Tony wrote: >>> This change seems to not related to what you try to fix. >>> Could this break some other workloads like copying from user address? >>> >> >> Yes, this move MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN set into next case, both COPY and >> MCE_SAFE type will set MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN, for EX_TYPE_COPY, we don't >> break it. > > Should Linux even try to take a core dump for a SIGBUS generated because > the application accessed a poisoned page? > > It doesn't seem like it would be useful. Core dumps are for debugging s/w > program errors in applications and libraries. That isn't the case when there > is a poison consumption. The application did nothing wrong. > > This patch is still useful though. There may be an undiscovered poison > page in the application. Avoiding a kernel crash when dumping core > is still a good thing.
Thanks for your confirm, and what your option about add MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN to EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE/FAULT_MCE_SAFE type to let do_machine_check call queue_task_work(&m, msg, kill_me_never), which kill every call memory_failure_queue() after mc safe copy return?
> > -Tony
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