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SubjectRe: [PATCH v10 0/9] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM
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On Wed, Jan 25, 2023, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 12:20:26AM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 24, 2023, Liam Merwick wrote:
> > > On 14/01/2023 00:37, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Dec 02, 2022, Chao Peng wrote:
> > > > > This patch series implements KVM guest private memory for confidential
> > > > > computing scenarios like Intel TDX[1]. If a TDX host accesses
> > > > > TDX-protected guest memory, machine check can happen which can further
> > > > > crash the running host system, this is terrible for multi-tenant
> > > > > configurations. The host accesses include those from KVM userspace like
> > > > > QEMU. This series addresses KVM userspace induced crash by introducing
> > > > > new mm and KVM interfaces so KVM userspace can still manage guest memory
> > > > > via a fd-based approach, but it can never access the guest memory
> > > > > content.
> > > > >
> > > > > The patch series touches both core mm and KVM code. I appreciate
> > > > > Andrew/Hugh and Paolo/Sean can review and pick these patches. Any other
> > > > > reviews are always welcome.
> > > > > - 01: mm change, target for mm tree
> > > > > - 02-09: KVM change, target for KVM tree
> > > >
> > > > A version with all of my feedback, plus reworked versions of Vishal's selftest,
> > > > is available here:
> > > >
> > > > git@github.com:sean-jc/linux.git x86/upm_base_support
> > > >
> > > > It compiles and passes the selftest, but it's otherwise barely tested. There are
> > > > a few todos (2 I think?) and many of the commits need changelogs, i.e. it's still
> > > > a WIP.
> > > >
> > >
> > > When running LTP (https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp) on the v10
> > > bits (and also with Sean's branch above) I encounter the following NULL
> > > pointer dereference with testcases/kernel/syscalls/madvise/madvise01
> > > (100% reproducible).
> > >
> > > It appears that in restrictedmem_error_page()
> > > inode->i_mapping->private_data is NULL in the
> > > list_for_each_entry_safe(inode, next, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) but I
> > > don't know why.
> >
> > Kirill, can you take a look? Or pass the buck to someone who can? :-)
>
> The patch below should help.
>
> diff --git a/mm/restrictedmem.c b/mm/restrictedmem.c
> index 15c52301eeb9..39ada985c7c0 100644
> --- a/mm/restrictedmem.c
> +++ b/mm/restrictedmem.c
> @@ -307,14 +307,29 @@ void restrictedmem_error_page(struct page *page, struct address_space *mapping)
>
> spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
> list_for_each_entry_safe(inode, next, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
> - struct restrictedmem *rm = inode->i_mapping->private_data;
> struct restrictedmem_notifier *notifier;
> - struct file *memfd = rm->memfd;
> + struct restrictedmem *rm;
> unsigned long index;
> + struct file *memfd;
>
> - if (memfd->f_mapping != mapping)
> + if (atomic_read(&inode->i_count))

Kirill, should this be

if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count))
continue;

i.e. skip unreferenced inodes, not skip referenced inodes?

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