Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 7 Feb 2023 18:50:41 +0100 | Subject | Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH 1/2] Fail I/O to thin pool devices | From | Zdenek Kabelac <> |
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Dne 07. 02. 23 v 17:19 Demi Marie Obenour napsal(a): > On Tue, Feb 07, 2023 at 03:02:51PM +0000, Joe Thornber wrote: >> Nack. >> >> I don't see the security issue; how is this any different from running the >> thin tools on any incorrect device? Or even the data device that the pool >> is mirroring. > > I special-cased the pool device for two reasons: > > 1. I have run the thin tools on the pool device myself before realising > that they needed to be run on the metadata device. It took me a > while to realize that I was using the wrong device. I have not made > that mistake with other devices, which is why I special-cased the > pool device in this patch. > > 2. Doing I/O to the pool device is pointless. The pool device is > strictly slower than the data device and exposes the exact same > contents, so accessing the pool device directly is never what one > wants. > > If there are backwards compatibility concerns, I could make this be > controlled by a Kconfig option, module parameter, or both. > >> In general the thin tools don't modify the metadata they're >> running on. If you know of a security issue with the thin tools please let >> me know. > > I am not aware of a concrete security problem, but in general I prefer > not to expose unnecessary attack surface.
lvm2 introduced 'protection' layer device - which keeps -tpool opened and thus avoid possibility to use i.e. mkfs on thin-pool itself (as it requires exclusive open)
Zdenek
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