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SubjectRe: [PATCH v6 19/41] x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors
On 23.02.23 00:07, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> On Mon, 2023-02-20 at 13:57 +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>
>>> + /*
>>> + * When a page becomes COW it changes from a shadow stack
>>> permission
>>> + * page (Write=0,Dirty=1) to (Write=0,Dirty=0,SavedDirty=1),
>>> which is simply
>>> + * read-only to the CPU. When shadow stack is enabled, a RET
>>> would
>>> + * normally pop the shadow stack by reading it with a "shadow
>>> stack
>>> + * read" access. However, in the COW case the shadow stack
>>> memory does
>>> + * not have shadow stack permissions, it is read-only. So it
>>> will
>>> + * generate a fault.
>>> + *
>>> + * For conventionally writable pages, a read can be serviced
>>> with a
>>> + * read only PTE, and COW would not have to happen. But for
>>> shadow
>>> + * stack, there isn't the concept of read-only shadow stack
>>> memory.
>>> + * If it is shadow stack permission, it can be modified via
>>> CALL and
>>> + * RET instructions. So COW needs to happen before any memory
>>> can be
>>> + * mapped with shadow stack permissions.
>>> + *
>>> + * Shadow stack accesses (read or write) need to be serviced
>>> with
>>> + * shadow stack permission memory, so in the case of a shadow
>>> stack
>>> + * read access, treat it as a WRITE fault so both COW will
>>> happen and
>>> + * the write fault path will tickle maybe_mkwrite() and map
>>> the memory
>>> + * shadow stack.
>>> + */
>>
>> Again, I suggest dropping all details about COW from this comment
>> and
>> from the patch description. It's just one such case that can happen.
>
> Hi David,

Hi Rick,

>
> I was just trying to edit this one to drop COW details, but I think in
> this case, one of the major reasons for the code *is* actually COW. We
> are not working around the whole inadvertent shadow stack memory piece
> here, but something else: Making sure shadow stack memory is faulted in
> and doing COW if required to make this possible. I came up with this,
> does it seem better?

Regarding the fault handling I completely agree. We have to treat a read
like a write event. And as read-only shadow stack PTEs don't exist, we
have to tell the MM to create a writable one for us.

>
>
> /*
> * For conventionally writable pages, a read can be serviced with a
> *
> read only PTE. But for shadow stack, there isn't a concept of
> * read-
> only shadow stack memory. If it a PTE has the shadow stack
> *
> permission, it can be modified via CALL and RET instructions. So
> * core
> MM needs to fault in a writable PTE and do things it already
> * does for
> write faults.
> *
> * Shadow stack accesses (read or write) need to be
> serviced with
> * shadow stack permission memory, so in the case of a
> shadow stack
> * read access, treat it as a WRITE fault so both any
> required COW will
> * happen and the write fault path will tickle
> maybe_mkwrite() and map
> * the memory shadow stack.
> */

That sounds good! I'd rewrite the last part slightly.

"
Shadow stack accesses (read or write) need to be serviced with
shadow stack permission memory, which always include write permissions.
So in the case of a shadow stack read access, treat it as a WRITE fault.
This will make sure that MM will prepare everything (e.g., break COW)
such that maybe_mkwrite() can create a proper shadow stack PTE.
"

--
Thanks,

David / dhildenb

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