Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 18 Oct 2023 16:36:43 +0800 | From | "Hou Wenlong" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH RFC 1/7] x86/head/64: Mark startup_gdt and startup_gdt_descr as __initdata |
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On Tue, Oct 17, 2023 at 09:02:27PM +0800, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > * Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com> wrote: > > > Hi Ingo, > > > > I have sent patch #6 separately for x86. Do you have any ideas about > > building the head code as PIE? Should I resend the patchset for the PIE > > feature? > > So I had a brief look, and despite reading 0/43 it was unclear to me what > the precise advantages of building as PIE are. > > Ie. could you please outline: > > - *Exactly* how much PIE based KASLR randomization would gain us in terms > of randomization granularity and effective number of randomization bits, > compared to the current status quo? > > - How is code generation changed at the instruction level - how does > kernel size change and what are the micro-advantages/disadvantages? > > - Are there any other advantages/motivation than improving KASLR? > > Ie. before asking us to apply ~50 patches and add a whole new build mode > and the maintainance overhead to support it into infinity and beyond, could > you please offer a better list of pros and cons? > Hi Ingo,
Thanks for your reply. I apologize for the confusion. Waht I meant to say is that I would like to resend the remaining part of this patchset that building the head code as PIE. As mentioned in the cover letter, building the head code as PIE can eliminate certain workarounds such as the "fixup_pointer" in head64.c and the inline assembly in mem_encrypt_identity.c. This is considered a cleanup. However, it is still necessary to use inline assembly to obtain the absolute symbol value during the pagetable building process.
Regarding the entire PIE patchset, I agree that it is complex and there are no obvious use cases apart from improving KASLR. As mentioned earlier, the primary motivation is to increase the flexibility of the kernel image address rather than prioritizing security, enabling the kernel image to be placed at any virtual address. The use cases in our internal environment are specific and not widespread, so we do not feel an urgent need to push it forward at the moment.
Thanks!
> Thanks, > > Ingo
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