Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 27 Jan 2023 16:05:29 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] io_uring,audit: do not log IORING_OP_*GETXATTR | From | Jens Axboe <> |
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On 1/27/23 4:01 PM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2023-01-27 17:43, Paul Moore wrote: >> On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:24 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: >>> Getting XATTRs is not particularly interesting security-wise. >>> >>> Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> >>> Fixes: a56834e0fafe ("io_uring: add fgetxattr and getxattr support") >>> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> >>> --- >>> io_uring/opdef.c | 2 ++ >>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) >> >> Depending on your security policy, fetching file data, including >> xattrs, can be interesting from a security perspective. As an >> example, look at the SELinux file/getattr permission. >> >> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-notebook/blob/main/src/object_classes_permissions.md#common-file-permissions > > The intent here is to lessen the impact of audit operations. Read and > Write were explicitly removed from io_uring auditing due to performance > concerns coupled with the denial of service implications from sheer > volume of records making other messages harder to locate. Those > operations are still possible for syscall auditing but they are strongly > discouraged for normal use. > > If the frequency of getxattr io_uring ops is so infrequent as to be no > distraction, then this patch may be more of a liability than a benefit.
(audit list removed)
Right now the xattr related functions are io-wq driven, and hence not super performance sensitive. But I'd greatly prefer to clean these up regardless, because once opcodes get upgraded from needing io-wq, then we don't have to go through the audit discussion at that point. Better to do it upfront, like now, regardless of expectation of frequency of calls.
-- Jens Axboe
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