Messages in this thread | | | From | Richard Weinberger <> | Date | Thu, 26 Jan 2023 16:13:11 +0100 | Subject | Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing |
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On Thu, Jan 26, 2023 at 3:58 PM Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> wrote: > > * Richard Weinberger (richard.weinberger@gmail.com) wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 3:22 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote: > > > Any virtual device exposed to the guest that can transfer potentially > > > sensitive data needs to have some form of guest controlled encryption > > > applied. For disks this is easy with FDE like LUKS, for NICs this is > > > already best practice for services by using TLS. Other devices may not > > > have good existing options for applying encryption. > > > > I disagree wrt. LUKS. The cryptography behind LUKS protects persistent data > > but not transport. If an attacker can observe all IO you better > > consult a cryptographer. > > LUKS has no concept of session keys or such, so the same disk sector will > > always get encrypted with the very same key/iv. > > Are you aware of anything that you'd use instead?
Well, I'd think towards iSCSI over TLS to protect the IO transport.
> Are you happy with dm-verity for protection against modification?
Like LUKS (actually dm-crypt) the crypto behind is designed to protect persistent data not transport. My fear is that an attacker who is able to observe IOs can do bad things.
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