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SubjectRe: [PATCH v5 23/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory
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On 19.01.23 22:23, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
> type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
> unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
> properly.
>
> Shadow stack memory is writable only in very specific, controlled ways.
> However, since it is writable, the kernel treats it as such. As a result
> there remain many ways for userspace to trigger the kernel to write to
> shadow stack's via get_user_pages(, FOLL_WRITE) operations. To make this a
> little less exposed, block writable GUPs for shadow stack VMAs.
>
> Still allow FOLL_FORCE to write through shadow stack protections, as it
> does for read-only protections.

So an app can simply modify the shadow stack itself by writing to
/proc/self/mem ?

Is that really intended? Looks like security hole to me at first sight,
but maybe I am missing something important.

--
Thanks,

David / dhildenb

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