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SubjectRe: [PATCH RFC v7 52/64] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
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On 10/1/23 19:33, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>
> On 1/9/2023 8:28 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 10/1/23 10:41, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>>> On 1/8/2023 9:33 PM, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>>> On 15/12/22 06:40, Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>>>
>>>>> Version 2 of GHCB specification added the support for two SNP Guest
>>>>> Request Message NAE events. The events allows for an SEV-SNP guest to
>>>>> make request to the SEV-SNP firmware through hypervisor using the
>>>>> SNP_GUEST_REQUEST API define in the SEV-SNP firmware specification.
>>>>>
>>>>> The SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST is similar to SNP_GUEST_REQUEST with the
>>>>> difference of an additional certificate blob that can be passed
>>>>> through
>>>>> the SNP_SET_CONFIG ioctl defined in the CCP driver. The CCP driver
>>>>> provides snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used by the KVM to get
>>>>> both the report and certificate data at once.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 185
>>>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>>>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |   2 +
>>>>>   2 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>> index 5f2b2092cdae..18efa70553c2 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>> @@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm,
>>>>> struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>>>>           if (ret)
>>>>>               goto e_free;
>>>>> +        mutex_init(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>>           ret = sev_snp_init(&argp->error, false);
>>>>>       } else {
>>>>>           ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
>>>>> @@ -2051,23 +2052,34 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm
>>>>> *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
>>>>>    */
>>>>>   static void *snp_context_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct
>>>>> kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>>>>   {
>>>>> +    struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>>       struct sev_data_snp_addr data = {};
>>>>> -    void *context;
>>>>> +    void *context, *certs_data;
>>>>>       int rc;
>>>>> +    /* Allocate memory used for the certs data in SNP guest
>>>>> request */
>>>>> +    certs_data = kzalloc(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>>>>> +    if (!certs_data)
>>>>> +        return NULL;
>>>>> +
>>>>>       /* Allocate memory for context page */
>>>>>       context = snp_alloc_firmware_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>>>>>       if (!context)
>>>>> -        return NULL;
>>>>> +        goto e_free;
>>>>>       data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(context);
>>>>>       rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_GCTX_CREATE,
>>>>> &data, &argp->error);
>>>>> -    if (rc) {
>>>>> -        snp_free_firmware_page(context);
>>>>> -        return NULL;
>>>>> -    }
>>>>> +    if (rc)
>>>>> +        goto e_free;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    sev->snp_certs_data = certs_data;
>>>>>       return context;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +e_free:
>>>>> +    snp_free_firmware_page(context);
>>>>> +    kfree(certs_data);
>>>>> +    return NULL;
>>>>>   }
>>>>>   static int snp_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int *error)
>>>>> @@ -2653,6 +2665,8 @@ static int snp_decommission_context(struct
>>>>> kvm *kvm)
>>>>>       snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context);
>>>>>       sev->snp_context = NULL;
>>>>> +    kfree(sev->snp_certs_data);
>>>>> +
>>>>>       return 0;
>>>>>   }
>>>>> @@ -3174,6 +3188,8 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct
>>>>> vcpu_svm *svm, u64 *exit_code)
>>>>>       case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
>>>>>       case SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES:
>>>>>       case SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC:
>>>>> +    case SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST:
>>>>> +    case SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST:
>>>>>           break;
>>>>>       default:
>>>>>           reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT;
>>>>> @@ -3396,6 +3412,149 @@ static int snp_complete_psc(struct kvm_vcpu
>>>>> *vcpu)
>>>>>       return 1;
>>>>>   }
>>>>> +static unsigned long snp_setup_guest_buf(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
>>>>> +                     struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data,
>>>>> +                     gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +    struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>>> +    struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>>> +    kvm_pfn_t req_pfn, resp_pfn;
>>>>> +    struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    if (!IS_ALIGNED(req_gpa, PAGE_SIZE) || !IS_ALIGNED(resp_gpa,
>>>>> PAGE_SIZE))
>>>>> +        return SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    req_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(req_gpa));
>>>>> +    if (is_error_noslot_pfn(req_pfn))
>>>>> +        return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    resp_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(resp_gpa));
>>>>> +    if (is_error_noslot_pfn(resp_pfn))
>>>>> +        return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    if (rmp_make_private(resp_pfn, 0, PG_LEVEL_4K, 0, true))
>>>>> +        return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    data->gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
>>>>> +    data->req_paddr = __sme_set(req_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
>>>>> +    data->res_paddr = __sme_set(resp_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    return 0;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static void snp_cleanup_guest_buf(struct
>>>>> sev_data_snp_guest_request *data, unsigned long *rc)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +    u64 pfn = __sme_clr(data->res_paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>>>> +    int ret;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    ret = snp_page_reclaim(pfn);
>>>>> +    if (ret)
>>>>> +        *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    ret = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
>>>>> +    if (ret)
>>>>> +        *rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static void snp_handle_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t
>>>>> req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +    struct sev_data_snp_guest_request data = {0};
>>>>> +    struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>>> +    struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>>> +    struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>>> +    unsigned long rc;
>>>>> +    int err;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
>>>>> +        rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
>>>>> +        goto e_fail;
>>>>> +    }
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &data, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
>>>>> +    if (rc)
>>>>> +        goto unlock;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    rc = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST, &data, &err);
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This one goes via sev_issue_cmd_external_user() and uses sev-fd...
>>>>
>>>>> +    if (rc)
>>>>> +        /* use the firmware error code */
>>>>> +        rc = err;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&data, &rc);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +unlock:
>>>>> +    mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +e_fail:
>>>>> +    svm_set_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2(vcpu, rc);
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static void snp_handle_ext_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
>>>>> gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +    struct sev_data_snp_guest_request req = {0};
>>>>> +    struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>>>>> +    struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>>> +    unsigned long data_npages;
>>>>> +    struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
>>>>> +    unsigned long rc, err;
>>>>> +    u64 data_gpa;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
>>>>> +        rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
>>>>> +        goto e_fail;
>>>>> +    }
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    data_gpa = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
>>>>> +    data_npages = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    if (!IS_ALIGNED(data_gpa, PAGE_SIZE)) {
>>>>> +        rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
>>>>> +        goto e_fail;
>>>>> +    }
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &req, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
>>>>> +    if (rc)
>>>>> +        goto unlock;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    rc = snp_guest_ext_guest_request(&req, (unsigned
>>>>> long)sev->snp_certs_data,
>>>>> +                     &data_npages, &err);
>>>>
>>>> but this one does not and jump straight to
>>>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c ignoring sev->fd. Why different? Can
>>>> these two be unified? sev_issue_cmd_external_user() only checks if
>>>> fd is /dev/sev which is hardly useful.
>>>>
>>>> "[PATCH RFC v7 32/64] crypto: ccp: Provide APIs to query extended
>>>> attestation report" added this one.
>>>
>>> SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST additionally returns a certificate blob and
>>> that's why it goes through the CCP driver interface
>>> snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used to get both the report and
>>> certificate data/blob at the same time.
>>
>> True. I thought though that this calls for extending sev_issue_cmd()
>> to take care of these extra parameters rather than just skipping the
>> sev->fd.
>>
>>
>>> All the FW API calls on the KVM side go through sev_issue_cmd() and
>>> sev_issue_cmd_external_user() interfaces and that i believe uses
>>> sev->fd more of as a sanity check.
>>
>> Does not look like it:
>>
>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c?h=v6.2-rc3#n1290
>>
>> ===
>> int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
>>                  void *data, int *error)
>> {
>>      if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops)
>>          return -EBADF;
>>
>>      return sev_do_cmd(cmd, data, error);
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_issue_cmd_external_user);
>> ===
>>
>> The only "more" is that it requires sev->fd to be a valid open fd,
>> what is the value in that? I may easily miss the bigger picture here.
>> Thanks,
>>
>>
>
> Have a look at following functions in drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:
> sev_dev_init() and sev_misc_init().
>
> static int sev_misc_init(struct sev_device *sev)
> {
>         struct device *dev = sev->dev;
>         int ret;
>
>         /*
>          * SEV feature support can be detected on multiple devices but
>          * the SEV FW commands must be issued on the master. During
>          * probe, we do not know the master hence we create /dev/sev on
>          * the first device probe.
>          * sev_do_cmd() finds the right master device to which to issue
>          * the command to the firmware.
>      */


It is still a single /dev/sev node and the userspace cannot get it
wrong, it does not have to choose between (for instance) /dev/sev0 and
/dev/sev1 on a 2 SOC system.

> ...
> ...
>
> Hence, sev_issue_cmd_external_user() needs to ensure that the correct
> device (master device) is being operated upon and that's why there is
> the check for file operations matching sev_fops as below :
>
> int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
>                                 void *data, int *error)
> {
>         if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops)
>                 return -EBADF;
> ..
> ..
>
> Essentially, sev->fd is the misc. device created for the master PSP
> device on which the SEV/SNP firmware commands are issued, hence,
> sev_issue_cmd() uses sev->fd.

There is always just one fd which always uses psp_master, nothing from
that fd is used.

More to the point, if sev->fd is still important, why is it ok to skip
it for snp_handle_ext_guest_request()? Thanks,


--
Alexey

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