Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 15 Aug 2022 10:33:28 +0200 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] capabilities: new kernel.ns_modules_allowed sysctl | From | Vegard Nossum <> |
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On 8/12/22 20:48, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Aug 10, 2022 at 10:25:17AM +0200, Vegard Nossum wrote: >> >> On 8/10/22 00:56, Kees Cook wrote: >>> On Tue, Aug 09, 2022 at 08:52:29PM +0200, Vegard Nossum wrote: >>>> Creating a new user namespace grants you the ability to reach a lot of code >>>> (including loading certain kernel modules) that would otherwise be out of >>>> reach of an attacker. We can reduce the attack surface and block exploits >>>> by ensuring that user namespaces cannot trigger module (auto-)loading. >>>>
[...]
> I agree, it'd be nice to have. I'm just trying to predict what kind of > push-back there may be. > > Can you address the build failures noted on the thread, and send a v2?
Did just now:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220815082753.6088-1-vegard.nossum@oracle.com/
> I > note that after this patch it looks like all module loading from a userns > gets logged, regardless of the setting. Is that intended?
Yeah, I thought it was useful to know even when the sysctl was disabled but I've removed it in v2 so the patch is less intrusive. I guess it can always be added later if it actually serves a purpose.
Thanks,
Vegard
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