lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2022]   [Aug]   [1]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
From
Subject[PATCH] random: use raw spinlocks for use on RT
Date
After handling several bug reports using various creative solutions,
it's becoming clear that random bytes are actually a useful thing to
happen from any ordinary context, including when interruptsare off.
Actually, that's been long recognized, which is why the RNG uses
spinlocks rather than mutexes. But on RT, those spinlocks are getting
converted back into sleeping locks.

This clearly is causing more problems than it might hypothetically
solve. Additionally, the locks in random.c are generally for fixed
durations doing CPU-bound operations -- no waiting for hardware or I/O
or the like. So this shouldn't result in a real harm to latency.

Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
Sebastian - I won't move forward with this without your Ack, obviously.
What do you think of this general approach? -Jason

drivers/char/random.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index d44832e9e709..67fdd71405b3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -180,9 +180,9 @@ static struct {
u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
unsigned long birth;
unsigned long generation;
- spinlock_t lock;
+ raw_spinlock_t lock;
} base_crng = {
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock)
+ .lock = __RAW_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock)
};

struct crng {
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
* because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this
* forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize.
*/
- spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;
if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies);
if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready))
crng_init = CRNG_READY;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
}

@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
if (!crng_ready()) {
bool ready;

- spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
ready = crng_ready();
if (!ready) {
if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY)
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
random_data, random_data_len);
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
if (!ready)
return;
}
@@ -333,11 +333,11 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
* for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng.
*/
if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) {
- spin_lock(&base_crng.lock);
+ raw_spin_lock(&base_crng.lock);
crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
crng->key, sizeof(crng->key));
crng->generation = base_crng.generation;
- spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock);
+ raw_spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock);
}

/*
@@ -555,14 +555,14 @@ enum {

static struct {
struct blake2s_state hash;
- spinlock_t lock;
+ raw_spinlock_t lock;
unsigned int init_bits;
} input_pool = {
.hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 },
.hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
+ .lock = __RAW_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
};

static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
@@ -579,9 +579,9 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
{
unsigned long flags;

- spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}

/*
@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
block.rdseed[i++] = random_get_entropy();
}

- spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);

/* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));

- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));

while (len) {
@@ -667,13 +667,13 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
urandom_warning.missed);
} else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
/* Check if crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY, to avoid race with crng_reseed(). */
if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) {
extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
crng_init = CRNG_EARLY;
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
}
}

@@ -756,11 +756,11 @@ static int random_pm_notification(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long actio
*/
ktime_t stamps[] = { ktime_get(), ktime_get_boottime(), ktime_get_real() };

- spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
_mix_pool_bytes(&action, sizeof(action));
_mix_pool_bytes(stamps, sizeof(stamps));
_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);

if (crng_ready() && (action == PM_RESTORE_PREPARE ||
(action == PM_POST_SUSPEND &&
@@ -848,10 +848,10 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
unsigned long flags;

- spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);

@@ -1062,10 +1062,10 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int nu
if (in_hardirq()) {
fast_mix(this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->pool, entropy, num);
} else {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
_mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}

if (crng_ready())
--
2.35.1
\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2022-08-01 16:28    [W:0.091 / U:0.996 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site