lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2022]   [Jul]   [13]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
From
Subject[PATCH v9,2/4] PKCS#7: Check codeSigning EKU for kernel module and kexec pe verification
Date
This patch adds the logic for checking the CodeSigning extended
key usage when verifying signature of kernel module or
kexec PE binary in PKCS#7.

Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
---
certs/blacklist.c | 5 ++--
certs/system_keyring.c | 4 +--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 9 ++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c | 2 +-
include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 4 ++-
include/keys/system_keyring.h | 7 +++--
7 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
index 41f10601cc72..fa41454055be 100644
--- a/certs/blacklist.c
+++ b/certs/blacklist.c
@@ -282,11 +282,12 @@ int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
* is_key_on_revocation_list - Determine if the key for a PKCS#7 message is revoked
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to check
*/
-int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
{
int ret;

- ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring);
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring, usage, false);

if (ret == 0)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index 5042cc54fa5e..66737bfb26de 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -263,13 +263,13 @@ int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
goto error;
}

- ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7);
+ ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret != -ENOKEY) {
pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform key is on revocation list\n");
goto error;
}
}
- ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage, true);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENOKEY)
pr_devel("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 3df3fe4ed95f..189536bd0f9a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -85,4 +85,13 @@ config FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST
depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER

+config CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU
+ bool "Check codeSigning extended key usage"
+ depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
+ depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+ help
+ This option provides support for checking the codeSigning extended
+ key usage when verifying the signature in PKCS#7. It affects kernel
+ module verification and kexec PE binary verification.
+
endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
index 9a87c34ed173..087d3761d9a8 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -16,12 +16,40 @@
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "pkcs7_parser.h"

+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU
+static bool check_eku_by_usage(struct key *key, enum key_being_used_for usage)
+{
+ struct public_key *public_key = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+ bool ret = true;
+
+ switch (usage) {
+ case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE:
+ case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE:
+ ret = !!(public_key->ext_key_usage & EKU_codeSigning);
+ if (!ret)
+ pr_warn("The signer '%s' key is not CodeSigning\n",
+ key->description);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#else
+static bool check_eku_by_usage(struct key *key, enum key_being_used_for usage)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
*/
static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
- struct key *trust_keyring)
+ struct key *trust_keyring,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ bool check_eku)
{
struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
@@ -112,6 +140,10 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
return -ENOKEY;

matched:
+ if (check_eku && !check_eku_by_usage(key, usage)) {
+ key_put(key);
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ }
ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
key_put(key);
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -135,6 +167,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate
* @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
+ * @check_eku: Check EKU (Extended Key Usage)
*
* Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
* keys we already know and trust.
@@ -156,7 +190,9 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* May also return -ENOMEM.
*/
int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
- struct key *trust_keyring)
+ struct key *trust_keyring,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ bool check_eku)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *p;
@@ -167,7 +203,8 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
p->seen = false;

for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
- ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring);
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring,
+ usage, check_eku);
switch (ret) {
case -ENOKEY:
continue;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c
index fa0bf7f24284..756e9f224d8a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int __init fips_signature_selftest(void)
if (ret < 0)
panic("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_verify() = %d\n", i, ret);

- ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, keyring);
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, keyring, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, false);
if (ret < 0)
panic("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_validate_trust() = %d\n", i, ret);

diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
index 38ec7f5f9041..5d87b8a02f79 100644
--- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
+++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@ extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* pkcs7_trust.c
*/
extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
- struct key *trust_keyring);
+ struct key *trust_keyring,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ bool check_eku);

/*
* pkcs7_verify.c
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 91e080efb918..bb33b527240e 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H

#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>

enum blacklist_hash_type {
/* TBSCertificate hash */
@@ -81,13 +82,15 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)

#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
extern int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size);
-extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
+extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage);
#else
static inline int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
{
return -ENOKEY;
}
--
2.26.2
\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2022-07-13 06:29    [W:0.052 / U:0.028 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site