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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2] mm/kfence: select random number before taking raw lock
On Thu, Jun 09, 2022 at 02:33PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> The RNG uses vanilla spinlocks, not raw spinlocks, so kfence should pick
> its random numbers before taking its raw spinlocks. This also has the
> nice effect of doing less work inside the lock. It should fix a splat
> that Geert saw with CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING:
>
> dump_backtrace.part.0+0x98/0xc0
> show_stack+0x14/0x28
> dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xec
> dump_stack+0x14/0x2c
> __lock_acquire+0x388/0x10a0
> lock_acquire+0x190/0x2c0
> _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x6c/0x94
> crng_make_state+0x148/0x1e4
> _get_random_bytes.part.0+0x4c/0xe8
> get_random_u32+0x4c/0x140
> __kfence_alloc+0x460/0x5c4
> kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x194/0x1dc
> __kthread_create_on_node+0x5c/0x1a8
> kthread_create_on_node+0x58/0x7c
> printk_start_kthread.part.0+0x34/0xa8
> printk_activate_kthreads+0x4c/0x54
> do_one_initcall+0xec/0x278
> kernel_init_freeable+0x11c/0x214
> kernel_init+0x24/0x124
> ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
>
> Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>

Thank you.

> ---
> Changes v1->v2:
> - Make the bools const to help compiler elide branch when possible,
> suggested by Marco.
>
> mm/kfence/core.c | 7 +++++--
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
> index 4e7cd4c8e687..4b5e5a3d3a63 100644
> --- a/mm/kfence/core.c
> +++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
> @@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
> unsigned long flags;
> struct slab *slab;
> void *addr;
> + const bool random_right_allocate = prandom_u32_max(2);
> + const bool random_fault = CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS &&
> + !prandom_u32_max(CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS);
>
> /* Try to obtain a free object. */
> raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
> @@ -404,7 +407,7 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
> * is that the out-of-bounds accesses detected are deterministic for
> * such allocations.
> */
> - if (prandom_u32_max(2)) {
> + if (random_right_allocate) {
> /* Allocate on the "right" side, re-calculate address. */
> meta->addr += PAGE_SIZE - size;
> meta->addr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, cache->align);
> @@ -444,7 +447,7 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
> if (cache->ctor)
> cache->ctor(addr);
>
> - if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS && !prandom_u32_max(CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS))
> + if (random_fault)
> kfence_protect(meta->addr); /* Random "faults" by protecting the object. */
>
> atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]);
> --
> 2.35.1
>

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